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Introduction 
• Individuals, households, firms, countries, etc are linked with one 
another through kinship, social and transactional ties 
 
• Network = Map of these interactions between these units 
 
• Such networks play an important role in many types of 
interactions: 
– Information transmission 
– Trade and exchange 
– Influence preferences 
 
• Consequently shape the beliefs, preferences and constraints of 
economic agents  Affect socioeconomic outcomes 
 
Introduction 
• Understanding and quantifying the effects of networks is of great 
interest, to academics and policymakers 
• Of pasrticular interest is the effect of social networks on socio-
economic outcomes 
– Social network = Links between individuals or households 
• Refer to the effect of the social network on outcomes as a social 
effect 
1. For example, influence of the average behaviour of an individual’s 
friends on the individual’s own behaviour  
2. Or effect of the total behaviour of an individual’s friends on the 
individual 
3. Or effect of individual’s proximity to central individuals in the 
network on his outcomes 
• Focus on social effects of type (1) above in this talk 
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Introduction 
• This type of social effect is relevant when research question of 
interest is of the type: 
– Are teenagers more likely to smoke if their friends smoke? 
– Is an individual more likely to exercise if her friends exercise? 
 
• Not very straightforward to obtain causal estimates of these 
effects 
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An Example 
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Exercises 
Did A and B’s exercising influence C to exercise? 
Challenges in answering this question 
• Did A and B influence C, or did C influence A and B? 
 
• There could be some unobserved factor influencing A, B and C 
to exercise (e.g. they live in the same neighbourhood and a gym 
has just opened up) 
 
• Or A, B and C all like exercising and became friends because 
they like to exercise; OR they are all very social, which 
influenced them to be become friends AND to exercise 
– There have similar unobserved preferences 
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Policy Experiments 
• Policy experiments offer one way of resolving some of these 
issues 
 
• Policy experiments offer a policy or programme to some units in 
a manner that is random or close to random (quasi-random) 
 
• Examples: 
– Random = Like allocating policy via the toss of a (fair) coin 
– Quasi-random = Policy allocated based on a cut-off, where units just 
below and just above the cut-off may be very similar in other 
respects  
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This talk... 
• Illustrates how random or quasi-random variation from policy 
experiments can be used to identify social effects 
 
• Economics focused approach 
 
• Reduced form effects 
– Policy experiments within a network 
 
• Discuss data requirements 
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Some definitions 
• Network = A set of nodes connected to each other by links 
– Nodes = Individuals, households, firms, countries 
– Links = Friendship, kinship, transactions, employment or other 
commercial relationship 
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Some Definitions 
• We refer to data with detailed information on nodes and edges 
as network data 
 
• Neighbours = the set of other nodes that a node is directly 
linked with  
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Neighbours of C 
Policy experiments and social effects 
• Consider a programme or policy that is allocated (quasi)-
randomly to a subset of a network 
– E.g. Providing free gym membership to some individuals in a 
network to encourage exercise 
• Note that it is important that the policy shifts the behaviour of 
some of the directly treated 
– Giving free gym memberships must induce some of those receiving 
them to exercise 
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Assumptions on network 
• It has well-defined and known boundaries 
– For example, a village or classroom 
• It is fixed 
– Policy doesn’t change the network 
• Policy should be uncorrelated with underlying network 
– Network should not have been formed to withstand the type of 
shock brought about by the policy 
• Separate out effect of neighbours’ actions on own action from factors influencing 
formation of network 
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Treatment Status vs. Treatment Exposure 
• To proceed, distinguish between treatment status and 
treatment exposure (Manski, 2013; and Aronow and Samii, 
2013) 
 
• Treatment status = whether node directly receives the policy or 
not 
 
• If there are social effects, then an individual’s receipt of the policy 
will also influence indirectly the outcomes of his neighbours 
 
• Treatment exposure = Includes all direct and indirect influences 
(through the network) of the treatment allocation on the individual 
– Depends on the underlying network structure, and treatment 
allocation 
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Defining Treatment Exposure 
• Many different ways of defining treatment exposure 
– Proportion of an individual’s neighbours that receive policy 
– Number of an individual’s neighbours receiving policy 
–  Position in network relative to those receiving policy 
• Direct neighbour or indirect neighbour 
 
• Choice depends on what one believes to be the mechanism 
through which providing the policy to an individual influences the 
outcomes of his neighbours 
 
• In this talk, we assume that the policy affects the treated 
individual and his direct neighbours only 
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More definitions 
• Subset of individuals receiving the policy (or treatment) = 
Directly Treated 
 
• Individuals who don’t receive the policy themselves, but whose 
neighbours do = Indirectly Treated 
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Example 
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Receive policy, i.e. ‘Directly Treated’ 
Don’t receive policy 
Indirectly treated 
Some intuition 
• Treatment exposure of indirectly treated individuals varies with 
– Position of individual in the network 
– The treatment allocation 
 
• Policy evaluation literature: If a policy is randomly or quasi-
randomly allocated, then comparing the average outcome of the 
treated and the untreated provides a credible estimate of policy 
effect 
 
© Institute for Fiscal Studies   
Within Network Variation – Reduced Form Effect 
• A natural comparison to make is to compare average outcomes 
of the indirectly treated, across different levels of treatment 
exposure 
 
 
 
• For this to be computed, one must observe nodes with treatment 
exposure levels s’ and s’’ in the data (Manski 2013) 
• Support condition 
 
• What does the experimental variation get us? 
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An Example 
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Exercises 
Did A and B’s exercising influence C to exercise? 
What challenges does experimental variation resolve? 
1. Did A and B influence C, or did C influence A and B? 
– We know who received the policy and who didn’t 
2. There could be some unobserved factor influencing A, B and C 
to exercise (e.g. they live in the same neighbourhood where a 
gym has just opened up) 
– Random or quasi-random allocation of the free gym memberships 
ensures that the policy is uncorrelated with these (unobserved) 
background factors 
3. Or A, B and C all like exercising and became friends because 
they like to exercise; Or A, B and C are all very social which 
makes them likely to have these friends and also to exercise  
– Since treatment exposure depends on the network structure, the 
support condition and (quasi-)random allocation insufficient to 
overcome this 
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Within Network Variation 
• So, endogenous formation of networks is still an issue 
– Further assumptions are needed 
 
• Manski (2013) suggests partitioning individuals in the network 
into ‘types’, based on: 
– Observed characteristics of the nodes (e.g. gender, age, etc) 
– Measures of their network position (e.g. number of links) 
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Example 
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• Types of untreated (orange) based on number of edges: 
– Type 1 = 1 edge = {A, F} 
– Type 2 = 3 edges = {E} 
 
Identifying Reduced Form Social Effect 
• Assume that individuals of the same ‘type’ have similar values of 
unobserved variables that affect the outcome and their linking 
decisions 
 
• Then reduced form social effect can be calculated by: 
– Calculating            for each ‘type’ 
– Take a weighted average of the ‘type’ specific social effects 
 
• For this to be possible, require that nodes with treatment 
exposure levels s’ and s’’ are observed for every type for which 
the exposure levels are feasible 
– Stronger support condition  
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Will this support condition hold in practice? 
• Not always 
 
• Going back to our simple example, we see that it fails (albeit with 
an artificially small network) 
 
• More generally, it is likely to fail with networks data, since the 
treatment of any node constrains the realised treatment 
exposure for its neighbours (Manski 2013). 
 
• Note also that for inference, need a sufficient proportion of 
nodes with each exposure level of interest within each ‘type’ 
 
• Parametric assumptions could be made to get around support 
condition 
– E.g. Assume linear relationship between outcome and treatment 
exposure 
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What data is needed for this? 
• Outcomes for the untreated individuals 
 
• Treatment status of all individuals in the network 
 
• Know enough about a network to be able to calculate the 
treatment exposure from the treatment allocation 
– If treatment exposure is measured as proportion of an individual’s 
friends who are treated, need to know the friends of the individual 
 
• Data from a sample can be used, but need to know the treatment 
status of all individuals that influence treatment exposure. 
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Summary 
• Outline when (quasi)-random allocation of policies and 
programmes can be used to uncover social effects 
 
• Highlight the key assumptions required for recovering reduced 
form social effects 
 
• Briefly outline data requirements for such analysis 
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Further Reading 
• A. Advani and B. Malde (2014), “Empirical Methods for Networks 
Data: Social Effects, Network Formation and Measurement 
Error”, IFS mimeo (Survey article). 
 
• C. Manski. ”Identification of Treatment Response with Social 
Interactions”. Econometrics Journal,16:S1–S23, 2013. 
 
• P. Aronow and C. Samii. ”Estimating Average Causal Effects 
Under General Interference”. Unpublished Manuscript, 2013. 
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Thanks! 
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